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                                            ABSTRACT
Following the collapse of Enron, many questions have been raised as to why the UK has avoided its Enron.ii 
Many commentators  have considered whether  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  UK's  system of  financial  
regulation relies more on a principles based system, which promotes more fairness in its application as  
opposed to a rules based system.iii However, the crucial roles played by auditors in financial reporting and 
the system of financial regulation and supervision have been overlooked to an extent. In view of a spate of  
financial scandals such as those of Enron, Worldcom, Tyco etc, the US Congress acted swiftly by enacting  
the Sarbanes Oxley Act on July 30 2002 with the aim of protecting investors and restoring their confidence 
in the financial system.iv Amongst the provisions within the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the prohibition of non-audit  
services by auditors providing audits at that particular time, is a main feature of the Act.v This provision not  
only  highlights  the  importance  of  the  role  of  the  external  auditor,  but  also  emphasizes  the  fact  that  
safeguards are essential in order to prevent that role from being abused. Much as there are lessons which  
could  be  learned  from  the  supervisory  approaches  adopted  by  various  jurisdictions,  there  are  also 
considerations on whether these jurisdictions could benefit from the measures implemented by US regulators  
and accounting bodies in the aftermath of Enron. 
Introduction
The collapse of Enron raised consideration of the following points namely:vi 
i) The regulation of auditors: Enron highlighted the fact that self-regulation and peer review 
in the US were no longer enough. It was also suggested that the US Public Oversight Board 
should be turned from a self-regulatory body appointed and financed by accountants into a 
statutory one which was independent and which reported to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Additional powers to the Public Oversight Board to ban or fine auditors 
for wrong doing were also proposed ;
ii)  Eliminating conflicts of interests in accounting firms;
iii)  Compulsory rotation of auditors – as Andersen had audited Enron since its establishment 
in 1983; and
iv)  Revisiting America's Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
The collapse of Enron also led to suggestions that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
its  standard-setting  body  –  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  may  have  to  look  to 
embracing international accounting standards.vii  
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  The  first  section  deals  with  systems  of  regulation  and 
supervision operating in various jurisdictions namely the off-site and on-site systems of supervision. 
It also highlights the fact that  the Basel Core Principles for effective Banking Supervision 1997 
encourages greater use of external auditors within the supervisory process. Section two deals with 
the framework of financial institutions in the US and suggests a single regulator for US financial 
services operating at federal level. The move towards the adoption of a single regulator in certain 
jurisdictions, in particular the UK, and the need for continued involvement of the central bank is 
also discussed. Factors which could undermine the external auditor's role in the supervisory process, 
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namely factors which could compromise his integrity, objectivity and independence are considered 
in section three. This section also considers the safeguards in place to avoid the external auditor's 
role being compromised whilst section four deals exclusively with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Section 
five then concludes with recommendations on various aspects of the paper.
Systems of supervision in various jurisdictions
During his speech,viii the chairman of the Federal Reserve System acknowledged the fact that the 
U.S banking and financial system was becoming increasingly “interwoven” with that of the rest of 
the world.  As a result of globalization, international cooperation and consistency, the need to work 
with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  was also recognised.ix The risk-based approach 
to supervision which has been adopted in countries such as  the United Kingdom and Switzerland, 
has  also  led  to  a  realisation  of  the  increasing  importance  in  relying  on  external  auditors.  In 
Switzerland, the banks' external auditors are said to “ act as eyes and ears of the Swiss Federal 
Banking  Commission  (SFBC)  or  at  least  provide  extra  eyes  and  ears”.x The  Swiss  supervisor 
depends a lot on the external auditor's supply of information and the external auditors carry out 
regular and direct supervisory functions.xi This approach is more in line with the requirements of the 
Basel Core Principles for effective Banking Supervision.
The On-site and Off-site Systems of Supervision
According  to  the  Basel  Core  Principles  for  effective  Banking  Supervision  1997,  an  effective 
banking supervisory system should consist of a mix of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision.xii 
Off-site supervision involves the regulator making use of external auditors. On-site work is usually 
done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by supervisors but 
may be undertaken by external auditors.
In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out  and justified on the basis  of the large 
number of small banks and on unit banking within particular states.xiii Unlike jurisdictions where 
authorities place   reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in the US must possess skills in 
order to evaluate asset quality and other areas governing a bank's activities.xiv The disadvantage in 
this  is  that  it  can be labour intensive and restricted by budgetary constraints.xv US supervisory 
authorities have responded to resource constraints in recent years by making greater use of off-site 
surveillance  systems.xvi However  the  use  of  off-site  surveillance  systems  can  also  be 
disadvantageous as computers cannot observe certain aspects of  examinations namely the scrutiny 
of management practices.xvii For this reason, the use of external auditors is also encouraged.
The system of bank supervision in jurisdictions such as Germany and Switzerland is based on one 
which delegates on-site examination and inspection of banks and the verification of their records to 
external  auditors.xviii In Switzerland,  auditors  are  engaged by the Federal  Banking Commission, 
subject to special statutory duties whilst in Germany, general auditors perform bank examinations 
and must inform the authorities should they discover facts warranting an audit qualification.xix In 
comparison to these two systems, the UK's system involves a reduced use of external auditors and 
mixed system of supervision whereby its regulator, the Financial Services Authority inspects banks 
(on-site) and utilises external auditors (off-site).                    
 In addition to the importance of a cooperative relationship between the supervisor and external 
auditor, the  structure of the system of regulation is also paramount. The dual banking system , a 
system that has been in existence in the US for over a century, has given rise to concerns  over the 
past years. Challenges facing the US include how to overhaul a system that has been in existence 
for so long in order to adapt to the changes faced in a global based modern world.  This is why the 
rationale for a more modern single regulator  amongst  other issues, needs to be considered.
The Regulatory Framework of US Financial Services
In the US financial service sector, there are completely different rules governing whether banks, 
securities and insurance firms are regulated at the federal or state level or both.xx Under the banking 
sector, both the national government and the states charter regulate banks.xxi This dual system of 
banking refers to the parallel state and federal banking systems that exist in the US.xxii It has many 
strong supportersxxiii and benefits of having a dual banking system result from allowing each of the 
two components of the system to function in accordance with their  particular characteristics.xxiv
National  banking  allows for  testing  and evaluation  of  efficiencies  and  benefits  that  flow from 
national standards.xxv However this sytem faces problems of inconsistencies in the application of 
rules and regulations. Since the Supreme Court's decision in  McCulloch v Maryland  in 1819, the 
precedent was set that states cannot constitutionally control powers of entities created under federal 
law.xxvi  In  relation  to  national  banks,  the  regulator  of  national  banks,  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency (OCC)xxvii is allowed by federal law to preempt state law.xxviii Courts have now realised 
that federal policies and regulations under certain circumstances may preempt inconsistent state 
laws and regulations.xxix The problems caused as a result of federal preemption have been a major 
topic over the past  years.xxx
The insurance sector is regulated wholly on state level and this system of state regulation also has 
its problems. These problems entail conflicting and overlapping state laws on product introduction 
and innovation.xxxi  Legislation was introduced to create an optional federal charter hence paving 
way for implicit or explicit preemption of state laws.
As a result of these loopholes for inconsistencies, why not have a single regulator operating on 
a federal level?  Even though the dual banking system  has its benefits, its costs would seem to 
outweigh  perceived  benefits.xxxii Problems  in  the  dual  banking  system  are  apparent   but  it  is 
obviously not easy to replace a system that has been in operation for over 140 years – a gradual 
shift  towards  federal  primacy  is  suggested  whereby  the  banking  and  securities  industry  could 
gradually work towards operating on a federal and national level. The insurance sector could then 
also adopt a system of gradual change towards a federal based level.
With the advent of globalisation and many foreign banks in operation, it would make more sense to 
give federal banks more supremacy. Conglomeratisation would raise the case for insurance also to 
be carried out on national as opposed to state level. However it could take a while  to successfully 
implement and adopt this where a system wholly on state level which has been in existence for so 
long were suddenly to be overhauled.
Factors such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the derivatives markets fuelled by the 
impact of information technology and increased competition have triggered a change in the way 
supervision is carried out around the globe. In addition, bank collapses have also contributed to a re-
think in the structure of financial regulation, that is, the way in which financial regulation is carried 
out. 
These developments make it virtually impossible to sustain some of the rules created for a different 
economic  environmentxxxiii and  what  is  true  of  rules,  also  applies  to  regulatory  structures.  As 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, financial regulation in the US is typified by the number of 
agencies involved both at state and federal level and this complicates any reform process towards a 
financial modernisation legislation.xxxiv During the course of 1997, the Federal Reserve Board had 
called for a consolidated “umbrella” supervision invested in itself  as the central bank of the United 
States.xxxv
In 1997, the UK government announced the adoption of a single regulator known as the Financial 
Services Authority, the FSA, to oversee the regulation and supervision of the financial system. The 
subsequent  establishment  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority  and  enactment  of  the  Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 became fully operational in December 2001. The rationale for a 
single financial regulator includes  inter alia the greater level of ease and efficiency with which a 
“single  regulator”  can  regulate  bank  financial-conglomerates compared  to  a  system  where  a 
multiple number of regulators exist.
The move towards a single regulator is not unique to the UK but is a trend that has gathered pace in 
the international capital markets. In Germany, the amalgamation of banks, securities and insurance 
supervisors, with the establishment of a single financial markets supervisory authority known as the 
Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision, has taken place. In Italy, there has been a move 
towards deregulation with the so-called ‘de-specialization’ of the banking system, which is the first 
step towards a possible single financial regulator being set up.
From the Treasury Committee's First Report on Barings Bank and International Regulation, it was 
highlighted that the Bank of England, the FSA's predecessor, could not perform its main objective 
of protecting the financial system without assessment of the functionings of the firms in the market. 
Same applies to the FSA. In order to achieve its objectives to the financial system, public, market 
and consumers, the FSA must get closer to the market and consumers.
This need to get closer to the market requires early warning indicators – indicators which the FSA's 
predecessor,  the Bank of England could easily detect. So who could provide the answer to the gap 
left as a result of the Bank of England's reduced involvement in the banking supervisory process? 
The FSA in its proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not getting 
'captured' by those it is supposed to be regulating. The external auditor would seem to have a role in 
the banking regulatory process by 
i) Acting as an intermediary in getting close to the market and consumers
ii) Helping the regulator avoid regulatory capture
Other issues
Central bank's involvement upon adoption of a single regulator.
One controversial issue following the adoption of a single financial services regulator in the UK has 
been the role left to the Bank of England – particularly regarding the safekeeping of the soundness 
of the financial system.xxxvi According to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury, 
the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority which was in circulation from October 28 
1997,xxxvii the Bank of England has continued responsibility for financial stability, comprising the 
lender  of  last  resort  (LOLR)  function.xxxviii However,  the  Bank  of  England  no  longer  has  the 
authority to gather information related to the well being of each individual bank and the system as a 
whole through direct supervision.xxxix This was so vital to determining whether or not to execute its 
discretion as LOLR in a particular case.xl  
Perceived  advantage  of  the  German  system  over  the  UK  system  of  financial  supervision  – 
Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank still retains supervisory functions (naturally as well as 
monetary policy setting functions) whilst benefiting from attributes of a single regulator (one of 
such attributes being the ability of a single regulator to manage cross sector services' risks more 
effectively).  In  contrast  the  UK  system  of  financial  services  supervision  comprises  a  system 
whereby banking  supervisory  functions  of  the  central  bank have  been  transferred  to  its  single 
regulator.
 
With  a  separate  agency  such  as  that  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority  dealing  with  bank 
supervision, the Bank of England could avoid damage to its reputation and also avoid conflicts of 
interest as lender of last resort in the event of bank failures. However it  may still be important for 
the central bank to be involved in the supervision of the banking system. The single regulator  for 
Germany,  BaFin,  is  responsible  for  the  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  financial  services 
institutions, insurance companies and securities trading.  However, Germany's central bank the 
Bundesbank, still performs key banking supervisory functions in Germany, helping to ensure 
the functional viability of the German credit and financial services institutions and the stability of 
the  financial  system.  BaFin  and  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  share  responsibilties  for  banking 
supervision and this division of responsibilities is aided through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU).
The  FSA,  HM Treasury  and  the  Bank  of  England  also  cooperate  through  a  Memorandum of 
Understanding. A more direct involvement between the Bank of England and the FSA would have 
been preferable – especially through greater involvement of the Bank of England  in the supervisory 
process – as is the case in Germany. The FSA could benefit more through an involvement of the 
Bank  of  England  in  the  supervisory  process  and  not  just  through  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding's  allocation of  their  responsibilties.  The MoU clearly  aids  accountability  in  the 
supervisory process – however,  the  quality and efficiency  of the supervisory process could be 
greatly  enhanced through the Bank of  England's  immense  potential  to  contribute  its  wealth  of 
knowledge to the banking supervisory process.
From the above-mentioned points, it would be vital to address the roles to be played by the central 
bank in  the  supervisory  process,  if  the  US were  to  consider  adopting  a  single  regulator.  In  a 
situation  whereby  supervisory  functions  result  to  acquisition  of  information  which  aids  the 
execution of central bank functions, or where central bank functions yield information which cannot 
be obtained easily by assigning all supervisory functions to a single agency, then a division of 
supervisory responsibilities between the central bank and the single agency would not be a bad 
ideaxli. However, if such economies of scope are superseded by the benefits of specialization, then 
the separation of supervision from central banking may provide better efficiency.xlii According to 
Huepkes, Quintyn and Taylor,xliii granting independence to financial sector supervisors is a more 
controversial  issue  than  that  of  central  bank independence.  More  importantly  and  as  stated  by 
Llewellyn, any country setting up the structure of a regulatory system, should consider such factors 
as the necessary number of agencies, the appropriate structure of those agencies, how the objectives 
for each agency should be defined,  the degree of coordination and information haring between 
different  agencies,  the  independence  and  accountability  of  the  regulatory  agencies  and  other 
factors.xliv
Plans  to  create  an integrated financial  regulator  will  most  likely influence  the  structure of  the 
supervisory framework for financial supervision and regulation in  the US. It is also likely to impact 
the role of auditors. Since the introduction of a single financial  services regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority in the United Kingdom,  the  FSA is  said to have taken a  more restrictive 
approach to its use of external auditors than its predecessor, the Bank of England xlv 
In view of this restrictive approach adopted by the FSA, it is worth mentioning that the role of 
external  auditors  in  financial  regulation  and  supervision  would  also  depend  upon  a  particular 
jurisdiction.  Employing  an  external  auditor  to  perform bank inspections  has  many  advantages. 
Audit firms may avoid resource and salary constraints which often prevent supervisory authorities 
from employing and retaining highly qualified staff.xlvi In addition auditors are able to combine 
prudential inspection with general accounting audits. However there are also issues which could 
affect the external auditor's ability to effectively carry out his role in the supervisory process. These 
issues could arise in situations where the external auditor finds himself faced with conflicting roles. 
The  primary  aim  of  the  audit  today  is  the  verification  of  financial  statements.  The auditor  provides 
independent verification on the financial statements of a company and as a result, the audit loses its 
value  when  such  independence  which  gives  credibility  to  the  financial  statements,  is 
undermined.The external auditor's role in financial regulation and supervision requires such factors 
as integrity, objectivity and independence to be met. 
Threats to objectivity and independence
Non audit services
Non-audit services may be defined as any services other than audit provided to an audit client by an 
auditor.xlvii There  are  three  categories  of  non-audit  services  namelyxlviii:Services  required  by 
legislation or contract  to be performed by auditors  of the business;  services that will  be better 
performed by auditors because of their knowledge of the business and services which could be 
provided by a number of firms.
Self interest threat
This  arises  when  auditors  have  financial  or  other  interests  which  might  result  to  them  being 
reluctant to take actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm.xlix 
Self review threat
This arises when the results of a non audit service performed by the auditors or by others within the 
audit firm are included in the figures disclosed in the financial statements.l As a result of providing 
non audit  service,  the  audit  firm is  associated  with  aspects  of  the  preparation  of  the  financial 
statements and may be unable to  give an objective view of relevant  aspects  of  those financial 
statements.li
Other  threats  to  objectivity  and  independence  includelii:  Management  threat,  advocacy  threat, 
familiarity threat and  intimidation threat.
The reporting accountant (skilled persons)
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the FSA to 
obtain  a  report  by  a  skilled  person  (reporting  accountant)  to  assist  the  FSA in  performing its 
functions under FSMA 2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, the FSA also has the powers to appoint competent persons to carry out investigations. 
The differences between the roles of reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and 
competent  persons  are  demonstrated  by  the  bearer  of  the  costs  for  work  carried  out  by  these 
persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the bank bears the cost directly whilst for work 
undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.liii The role of the reporting accountant has 
become so important that it  will be incorporated into the entire regulated sector.liv Even though 
skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of the 
regulated firm.lv This raises the question of independence since both roles of auditor and reporting 
accountant  are  distinct  roles  which  still  overlap  occasionally.lvi Measures  have  however  been 
adopted by the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest. Chapter 5 of the FSA 
Supervision Manual provides examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. 
The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it 
is cost effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to 
the matter to be reported on. There are also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can 
use skilled persons.lvii
From 1  April  2003 to  31  March  2004,  the FSA exercised its  power  under  section  166 of  the 
Financial Services and Markets Act  2000 to require firms to produce a skilled person's report in 28 
situations.lviiiThis  is  a  considerable  reduction  in  investigations  from  the  number  of  reporting 
accountants  commissioned  under  its  predecessor's  regime  where  section  39  Banking  Act  1987 
frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.lix
Mandatory rotation of audit firms
The risk of having an auditor becoming too familiar with a particular business, hence becoming too 
close to a company and compromising his independence is the main reason why mandatory rotation 
of audit firms has been proposed. Whilst supporters of mandatory rotation believe that the auditor's 
independence would be strengthened as a result of making companies change their auditor after a 
fixed period of years, many have opposed the idea of mandatory rotation, arguing that it is a costly 
exercise.
Having considered these points, reasons for using external auditors in more capacities than others 
may be justified across different jurisdictions.The reason for Britain's FSA's reduced use of external 
auditors within the banking supervisory process may well be as a result of greater potential for 
conflicts of interest. According to research on how European arrangements differ from the UK, the 
dual role of auditors and reporting accountants/skilled persons directly comparable to that of the UK 
does not exist at European level.lx One significant difference between the auditing professions in 
Germany  and  Britain  is  the  existence  of  auditing  as  a  distinct  profession  in  Germany.lxi The 
Wirtschaftspruefer  is a qualified auditor and in contrast to Britain, an accounting profession does 
not exist in Germany.lxii In Britain, auditors grew more dependent on the expertise of accountants 
over  the years until  the audit  function became dominated by the accounting profession.lxiii The 
concepts of “auditing” and “accounting” are often used interchangeably in Britain.lxiv
Where there is potential for conflicts of interest to arise, it may be well worth reducing the use of 
external auditors in such circumstances. As stated by Polizatto,lxv the appropriateness of delegating 
on-site inspections to external auditors would very much depend on an assessment of whether it is 
best able to perform the on-site verification function. This requires consideration of factors such as 
skills, competence, experience and independence from political or other influence.lxvi
However,  weighing the immense benefits  which external auditors  contribute  to the supervisory 
process, it could be worthwhile implementing a law like that of Sarbanes Oxley in Britain. The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act would discourage the dual role of auditors and reporting accountants/skilled 
persons  thereby  encouraging  greater  use  of  external  auditors  within  the  financial  supervisory 
process.
Sarbanes Oxley Act
Sarbanes Oxley was designed to tackle corporate malpractices and restore investor confidence in 
the aftermath of the Enron scandal but it has been made unpopular particularly amongst European 
companies, as a result of its provisions which some say is costly and burdensome. lxvii The objectives 
of Sarbanes Oxley are as follows: To improve the quality and accuracy of financial reporting; to 
reduce fraud and false accounting; to raise awareness of internal controls; to increase executive 
responsibility for reported numbers and to strengthen the independence of audit firms.lxviii 
Section 404 of the Act places a requirement on directors to document and confirm the effectiveness 
of internal controls on spending and usage of company assets and also to report on any discovered 
weaknesses. A representative of the European Employers' Federation, Jerome Chauvin, stated that 
European companies felt that costs of Sarbanes Oxley were disproportionate and that there was 
need  for  reform so  that  objectives  of  Sarbanes  Oxley  were  met  at  a  reasonable  cost.lxix Other 
criticisms directed at the Sarbanes Oxley Act include:lxx  The fact that disclosure has proven to be a 
more efficient means of regulating markets and reduces the need for substantive regulation; that 
increasing  substantive  regulation  would  prevent  issuers  from  coming  to  the  markets;  that 
substantive  regulation  is  likely  to  increase  costs  and  that  markets  can  regulate  themselves. 
Espinosalxxi (2004) counters these arguments by concluding amongst other things that disclosure 
does not reduce the need for substantive regulation and that strong regulation does not prevent 
access to the markets.lxxii He also concludes that the US Congress, in adopting Sarbanes Oxley, 
considered  that  though  disclosure  was  still  vital  in  ensuring  transparency  within  the  financial 
markets, reforms were still necessary to ensure that the source of such disclosure was free from 
conflicts of interests and thereby obtain correct and accuarte disclosure.lxxiii
CONCLUSION
The role of the external auditor in financial services regulation and supervision is one which could 
be harnessed  in such a way as to prevent further corporate scandals such as Enron. This is possible 
where necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that the external auditor's integrity, objectivity 
and independence are not compromised. The Sarbanes Oxley Act has gone a long way to ensure 
this.
A post Enron consequence is the decline in auditors' undertaking consultancy or non-audit services and an 
increased perception of auditor independence.lxxiv Post Enron developments, in particular the US Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act meant that financial services firms with a US listing were not allowed to have their auditors 
undertaking  consultancy  work.lxxv Section  166  skilled  persons'  reports  being  commissioned  by  Britain's 
Financial  Services  Authority  and  if  undertaken  by  auditors,  arguably  should  not  be  classified  as 
“consultancy”.lxxvi However if the FSA perceived a conflict of interest, it had the power to require others to 
be appointed.lxxvii
Following the collapse of Enron, a lot of comparisons were drawn between the principles based 
approach  which  exists  in  the  UK  and  the  US  rules-based  approach.  Under  David  Tweedie's 
guidance during the 1990s, the UK Accounting Standards Board developed accounting standards 
which relied heavily on rules but still looked at the substance of the transactions, and if the rules did 
not  produce  the  right  answer,  then  one  would  have  to  look  to  the  substance  to  produce  the 
answer.lxxviii One of the major problems with Enron was the off balance-sheet debt which resulted from 
direct following of rules without being able because the accounting standards did not permit, to consider the 
substance of the transaction.lxxix Many of the differences between the UK and US accounting practices 
resulted from changes driven by corporate collapses of the 80s and early 1990s and such differences 
need to be considered when deciding whether to adopt certain post Enron reforms which have been 
adopted in the US. 
In contrast to the US, the European Union's reaction to financial scandals has been less stringent.lxxx 
Whilst the US has enacted rules on corporate governance to ensure full and accurate dsclosure, the 
EU issued codes of ethics for public companies.lxxxi In view of all that has already been mentioned 
in  this  paper,  although  the  US  would  need  to  embrace  international  trends  –  including  the 
possibility of adopting a single regulator operating on a federal level, Europe could also well benefit 
from considering a move towards Sarbanes Oxley. Historical developments, differences between 
the regulatory and accounting practices existing between the different jurisdictions involved would 
need to be considered. Conglomeratisation and globalisation are however factors peculiar to both 
the EU and the US and which justify a need for change. One of the greatest benefits of having a 
single regulator for financial services is the ability of a single regulator to manage cross sector 
services' risks more effectively.
Debates about whether the UK has its principles-based regulatory tool to thank for avoiding another 
major corporate scandal are sure to continue. The impact of the adoption of a single regulator of 
financial services in the UK is a significant move which cannot be ignored. The crucial role that can 
be played by external  auditors within this framework governed by the single  financial  services 
regulator is one which should be exploited. 
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